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The world’s first known inflation-indexed bonds were issued by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts in 1780 during the Revolutionary War. These bonds were invented to deal with 
severe wartime inflation and with angry discontent among soldiers in the U.S. Army with the 
decline in purchasing power of their pay. Although the bonds were successful, the concept of 
indexed bonds was abandoned after the immediate extreme inflationary environment passed, and 
largely forgotten until the twentieth century. In 1780, the bonds were viewed as at best only an 
irregular expedient, since there was no formulated economic theory to justify indexation. 
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The Invention of Inflation-Indexed Bonds in Early America 
 
Robert J. Shiller 
 
 
The world’s first known inflation-indexed bonds were issued by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts in 1780 during the Revolutionary War. These were issued to U.S. soldiers as deferred 
compensation for their service, and were called “depreciation notes” or “soldiers’ depreciation 
notes.” While there are earlier examples of measures to compensate people for the loss of purchasing 
power of their money, this appears to be the first time that a debt contract specified payments 
formally linked to a price index.1 
This important invention came to light in an environment where stark necessity spurred 
invention, and where practical people under pressure devised these bonds as an immediate expedient 
to deal with problems they must have regarded as of life-and-death importance to them.  The long-
term significance of these bonds, to be issued by other entities much later and in more normal times, 
came to be appreciated by scholars only decades, even centuries, later. 
Those anonymous people who made this invention in 1780 apparently did so without the help 
of any academic or theoretical literature on indexation. John Maynard Keynes is widely quoted as 
                                                 
1Of course, it is not absolutely known that this is the first indexed bond. Willard Fisher, who 
studied these Massachusetts bonds extensively, wrote “It is by no means impossible that a story of 
similar monetary or fiscal policy may lie hidden in the records of other states whose early histories 
have not been studied as much as the history of Massachusetts. There certainly was no little endeavor 
for harmonious action among the New England states in matters of financial policy” (Fisher, 1913, p. 
448). Fisher points out that Governor George Clinton of New York (the uncle of the later, and now 
more famous, New York Governor DeWitt Clinton) expressed interest in the Massachusetts indexed 
bonds in 1780. By extension, we can easily imagine that the Massachusetts experience derives from 
imitation or extension of some now forgotten earlier example. 
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asserting that most economic innovations derive ultimately from some “academic scribblers.”2 But, 
in fact, in the case of indexed bonds, there was no academic precursor. 
As of 1780, there appears to have been no mention at all in any scholarly literature of indexed 
bonds or even of the concept of indexation. Ninety years ago Wesleyan University Professor Willard 
Fisher sought to find an earlier reference to indexation and the best he could find was a statement by 
Adam Smith, four years before 1780, that seems at best to refer to the concept only obliquely, and 
dismissing it.3 Histories of the theory of indexation often start with William Stanley Jevons, who 
wrote expansively in favor of indexed bonds and other indexed contracts in 1875. A much earlier, if 
less eloquent reference, and apparently the first clear treatment of the concept of indexation, is 
Joseph Lowe, in 1822. That was already 42 years after the Massachusetts issuance of indexed bonds. 
The usual history of the actual creation of indexed bonds starts in the twentieth century. Prof. 
Irving Fisher of Yale University made the advocacy of inflation-indexed bonds a lifelong campaign 
of his, and the company he co-founded, the Rand-Kardex Co., first issued inflation-indexed bonds in 
1925. There were no imitators for some years, and he died in 1947 with little evidence that his 
campaign was a success. Finland introduced indexed bonds in 1945, Israel and Iceland in 1955, 
                                                 
2“Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, 
are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, 
are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.” John Maynard Keynes, 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936, Ch. 24 v. 
3Adam Smith wrote “Labour, it must always be remembered, and not any particular 
commodity or set of commodities, is the real measure of the value of silver and of all other 
commodities.” The Wealth of Nations, Nicholson’s edition, p. 79. Willard Fisher was apparently 
correct that this passage, by referring to the possibility of a set of commodities as an indicator of 
value, indicates at least an intuitive awareness of the possibility of indexation. Perhaps Smith would 




Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1966, Columbia in 1967, Argentina in 1972, the United Kingdom in 1975, 
Australia in 1985, Mexico in 1989, Canada in 1991, Sweden in 1994, New Zealand in 1995, United 
States in 1997, and France issue indexed bonds for the euro area  in 1998. This period, from 1925 to 
the end of the 20th century, appears to have been a period of the very slow dissemination of the 
concept of indexed from the advocacy of Irving Fisher and others of his time.4 This huge worldwide 
explosion of indexed bonds began 145 years after the first example was issued. 
 
The 1780 Issue of Inflation-Indexed Bonds 
Already by 1780, the state of Massachusetts had had longstanding problems with an unstable 
price level due to the state government’s excessive printing of paper money. These problems had 
persisted for the better part of a century when the depreciation notes were issued. Inflation had been a 
deep-set problem that accounted for a lot of the problems of the state, and that had occupied a great 
deal of public attention over these years. 
The problems started with the Massachusetts government’s attempt to pay for an 
unsuccessful 1790 invasion of Quebec during King William’s War (1689–97). Unable to pay its 
soldiers immediately, the state government resorted to printing paper money that it promised to 
redeem later. These were bearer notes, and so many or most of the soldiers spent them immediately, 
and the notes entered circulation as a form of paper money. Since they were not immediately 
redeemable in specie, they sold at a discount, a discount which varied through time not only due to 
changes in discount rates but also due to changes in public perceptions of the likelihood that they 
                                                 
4See Campbell and Shiller (1996). 
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would eventually be paid in specie.5 
Further such notes were issued to soldiers during Queen Anne’s War (1702–13). 
Massachusetts issued more paper money than it could reasonably be expected to repay. Printing of 
money continued, and public faith in the paper declined, and it then sold at a substantial discount 
from sterling for many years.  
Already by 1743, the Governor of Massachusetts William B. Shirley (1694–1771) wrote of 
these problems in a report to the Board of Trade, that in the last thirty years the currency had 
“gradually sunk in their value from forty to four hundred forty percent below sterling money.” Since 
a 1712 law had made the local currency legal tender at face value for all debts, he noted that losses 
were incurred by “creditors of all kinds who had had dealings with the people of New England, and 
had not been cautious enough to ascertain the value of their debts, by special contracts for the 
payment of ‘em, either in sterling or proclamation money.”6  
The intellectual environment in New England then had apparently prepared the way for this 
innovation, and evidence of this environment can be found as early as 1742 in legislation, in 
Massachusetts, that specified that, in times of highly depreciated currency, court judgments should 
take account of the depreciation as calculated using the exchange rate between a new local currency, 
later called equity bills, and the British pound sterling. Similar legislation was enacted around that 
                                                 
5One lively source of debate that arose is whether the government should ultimately pay the 
notes in full, when the benefit accrues to the “speculators” who bought the notes at a discount, rather 
than the soldiers who sacrificed for their country. A leading economist of the time, Pelatiah Webster 
[1791], argued strongly for paying the notes in full. 
6William B. Shirley, Report to the Board of Trade Boston, December 23, 1743, as quoted in 
John Gorham Palfrey, History of New England, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1890. Proclamation 
money refers to an amount of Spanish milled dollars corresponding to the pound sterling as 
prescribed in a proclamation of Queen Anne in 1704. 
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time in Connecticut, New Hampshire, and  Rhode Island. This legislation established a precedent for 
acknowledging the effects of a depreciation of the currency.   
The costs of King George’s War (1744–48) threatened to destroy the value of the large 
amount of currency issued by Massachusetts to pay for the war. A further crisis was avoided by the 
fact that Britain, in whose behalf Massachusetts had fought the war, shipped over enough solid coin 
to redeem the new currency.  
Problems reappeared when the state of Massachusetts once again issued paper money to pay 
for its part in the Revolutionary War. Once again, the state government could not raise enough 
money through taxes to pay for its part in the war, and once again the soldiers were paid in bearer 
notes that they were obliged to sell immediately at a substantial discount.  The wartime inflation 
meant that soldier’s pay was losing much of its value between the time promised and actually 
received, and by the time the soldiers were able to spend or send it to their families to spend it. The 
soldiers had been paid in nominal terms only, but had been cheated by inflation out of their real pay, 
a situation that strongly discouraged their willingness to serve their country further. 
A Massachusetts Act of 1777 called “An Act to Prevent Monopoly and Oppression” 
attempted to deal with the problem of inflation by fixing prices. The act gave a list of prices 
measured in Massachusetts pounds of 50 commodities in Boston, to be used at that time to allow 
government fixing of prices to forestall wartime inflation. The price-fixing policy was disastrous. It 
substantially shut down the market for these basic needs, and was quickly abandoned. Some other 
expedient was clearly necessary to assure just compensation of soldiers. 
By the late 1770s, when these first inflation-indexed bonds were conceived and designed, the 
U.S. War of Independence was in a difficult stage. In 1779, the British Army had just captured the 
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state of Georgia and had taken Charleston South Carolina. The eastern seaboard of the United States 
was blocked by the British Navy. The morale of the United States Army was low: They were poorly 
fed, poorly clothed, and often sick. The morale was so low that, as we now know, there were actual 
army mutinies in 1780 and 1781. There was real concern in 1779 that it would be impossible to keep 
an army if something were not done to address the loss of value of their pay. The invention of 
indexed bonds came in response to this very real and dangerous crisis. 
The U.S. Congress issued a letter in 1779 to be read by ministers, from the pulpit, that 
detailed the problem: “The present situation of public affairs demands your most serious attention, 
and, particularly, the great and increasing depreciation of your currency requires the immediate and 
strenuous and united efforts of all true friends to their country, for preventing an extension of the 
mischiefs that have already flowed from that source . . . . Our enemies prosecuting the war by sea 
and land with implacable fury and with some success, taxation at home and borrowing abroad, in the 
midst of difficulties and dangers, were alike impracticable. Hence, the continued necessity of new 
emissions.”7 The monetary situation was therefore an inevitable consequence of the precarious 
situation of the nation, its resolution an inherent aspect of the defense of the nation, and as part of 
patriotic duty Congress called upon the states to take measures to assure that its soldiers were fairly 
compensated. The Massachusetts legislature passed a resolution on February 6, 1779 to give just 
settlement of the soldiers’ claims, and committees were established that would propose adjustments. 
The work of these committees led then to the creation of the indexed bonds. 
The depreciation bonds were created in Massachusetts by “An Act to provide for the Security 
and Payment of the Balances that may appear to be due by Virtue of a Resolution of the General 
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Assembly of the sixth of February, One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy-nine, to this States 
Quota of the Continental Army, agreeable to the Recommendation of Congress, and for Supplying 
the Treasury with a Sum of Money for that Purpose,” January 13, 1780. The Act was part of an effort 
to live up in substance to the promise of the 1777 Act which had failed to fix prices. Unable to fix 
prices, the government of Massachusetts did the next best thing, to provide enough income to their 
soldiers so that they could buy the basket of goods defined by [a subset of] the list of goods in the 
1777 act as if they still had their specified prices. Perhaps due to the difficulties of collecting price 
data, the indexed bonds were based on only 4 of the 50 commodities described in the 1777 act. 
We can read from these engraved bonds themselves (and surrounded by a border apparently 
in the hand of the official engraver for Massachusetts, Paul Revere) the terms of the indexation. An 
example of these bonds, dated January 1, 1780, is reproduced here as Figure 1. 
Both Principal and Interest to be paid in the then current Money of said STATE, in a 
greater or less SUM, according as Five Bushels of CORN, Sixty-eight Pounds and 
four-seventh Parts of a Pound of BEEF, Ten Pounds of SHEEPS WOOL, and Sixteen 
Pounds of SOLE LEATHER shall then cost, more or less than One Hundred and 
Thirty Pounds current money, at the then current Prices of said ARTICLES—This SUM 
being THIRTY-TWO TIMES AND AN HALF what the same Quantities of the same Articles would 
cost at the Prices affixed to them in the Law of this STATE made in the Year of our 
Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy-seven, intitled, “An Act to prevent 
Monopoly and Oppression.” 
 
The paragraph defines a price index, specified as it is in terms of fixed quantities of the articles. The 
index equaled 4.0 in 1777 and 130.0 in 1780, a 32-fold increase. Calculations of the amount owed to 
soldiers in light of this depreciation of their pay were made. The soldiers were then given in 1780, to 
settle their claims, the inflation-indexed bonds, divided into four equal parts. Those who enlisted for 
the rest of the war were given shorter maturities, four notes maturing in 1781, 1782, 1783 and 1784. 
                                                                                                                                                             
7Quoted in Joseph Felt (1839), pp. 180–81. 
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Others were paid in notes maturing in 1785, 1786, 1787 and 1788. A Table from the Act showing 
calculation of the index for 1777 to 1780 appears here as Table 1. 
The quantities used to define the index were apparently not arrived at by reference to any 
representative market basket. Certainly, it is far more likely that a family would consume five 
bushels of corn than 16 pounds of sole leather in a year’s time. The quantities were instead defined 
so that they represent equal currency values of the commodities in 1777. According to the 1777 Act, 
“Good Indian meal or corn” cost 4 shillings a bushel, “good merchantable sheeps wool” 2 shillings a 
pound, “good well-fatted grass fed beef” three pence a pound, “stall fed beef, well fatted” 4 pence a 
pound, and “tanned hides” one shilling 3 pence a pound. The quantities specified on the bond all cost 
£1 at these prices (where the two beef prices are averaged to be 3.5 pence a pound.) This index is 
neither Laspeyres or Pasche, but might be roughly justified in terms of a model which asserts that the 
price change of each commodity equals an underlying inflation rate plus a noise term that is, 
measured as a fraction of base year price, independent across commodities and identically 
distributed.8 
Once in place, the indexation implicit in the Massachusetts indexed bonds led to at least one 
other application of the index. The index was used to index the pay of the President of Harvard 
College, Samuel Langdon. The account, reproduced here as Table II, shows the pay that President 
Langdon received from 1774 to 1780 according to his promised rate of pay of £200 per annum, along 
with the real value, in January 1775 prices, of these payments, as well as of some other, much larger, 
                                                 
8 Such an index would be dictated by a model that asserts that each commodity has a price 
proportional to an aggregate price level plus an error which is independent of all other commodities. 
Such a model resembles that of the repeat-sales price indexes for individual homes, see Baily Muth 
and Nourse (1963), or its arithmetic counterpart, Shiller (1991). 
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payments that were made to him in 1780, apparently in an effort to compensate him for the real value 
of his pay lost to inflation. The account converts all these payments to 1775 prices, and sums them. 
The difference between this sum and the sum of the actual payments is the amount owed to President 
Langdon, in January 1775 prices. This then is an early, perhaps the first, cost of living allowance in a 
civilian labor contract. 
The beginning of indexed bonds, and of indexation more generally, in 1780 was a bright spot 
in the history of financial innovation. But, unfortunately, it did not stick. The notes were soon 
replaced. A 1782 Act provided for the eventual consolidation of the state debt, and the replacement 
of the depreciation notes with new specie securities. The consolidation was complete by 1786, two 
years before the maturity of the longest-dated notes issued in 1780. In 1786 an Act stipulated that 
“…it is altogether unnecessary that the Committee, or Agents, appointed for the collecting and 
ascertaining the value of the several articles specified in the Notes issued for the pay of the late 
Continental Army, commonly called depreciation Notes, be any more contained in office.”9 The 
experiment with indexed bonds ends abruptly, and with no explanation. 
Despite its abrupt end, the invention of indexation in Massachusetts in 1780 is a real example 
of significant financial innovation. It helped solve some real and pressing problems facing a new 
nation, and did so in a logical and orderly way that could have been generalized to solve many other 
subsequent monetary policies.  
 
                                                 
9Quoted in Willard Fisher (1913), p. 447. From Massachusetts Archives, 237, p. 477. 
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The Role of Economic Theory in Promoting Indexation 
It seems here that necessity was the mother of this invention. The example of the creation of indexed 
bonds in Massachusetts in 1780 appears to deny the importance of the “academic scribblers” that 
Keynes extolled, for the invention appeared long before the scholars wrote about it. And yet, in 
another sense, it only reinforces their importance, for the practice of indexation of bonds did not take 
hold at that time. It is a reasonable supposition that the indexed bonds did not continue because there 
was no well-conceived model that would justify and explain them. 
Since the indexation was proposed in 1780 only as an expedient for dealing with a most 
pressing temporary problem, there was no economic theory suggesting its fundamental importance. 
When the Revolutionary War ended in 1783, there was thus no more perceived need for these bonds. 
Collecting data and computing a price index consumes resources, and if inflation is no longer a 
pressing and immediate issue, then indexation might plausibly be dropped. The price index used was 
very crude, and its defects might be seen to outweigh its advantages in a time of relatively stable 
prices. In fact, however, the history of the United States in the 19th century reveals considerable 
instability of prices, and so it would have been better if the indexation had been continued.  
The failure to pursue the idea of indexation after 1780 may also be due to some of the 
problems of index number theory. We can imagine that there was some intuitive grasp of the 
problems of price indexes that were later resolved by index number theorists. As time went on, in the 
20th century, index number theorists realized that there is a substantial problem with a simple index 
such as that used in Massachusetts in 1780. If one of the commodities used to define the index 
became scarce, a shortage of it develops, and the price of that commodity might jump very high. 
Consumers would normally substitute for another commodity, and thus would not need as much 
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money as indicated by the price index to maintain their standard of living. The price index would 
then jump sharply, and become unrepresentative of the increase in the true cost of living. If 
bondholders are paid the amount specified in the index formula, then they will enjoy a windfall, 
since they can just switch their consumption to other commodities that are not in short supply, and 
find that their purchasing power has been increased dramatically by the indexation. The bond issuers, 
on the other side of the transaction, are similarly affected, but in the opposite direction. 
Well into the 20th century Irving Fisher proposed that the solution to this problem is to tie 
indexed payments to a sort of price index that he called an “ideal index.” The Fisher ideal index has 
no predictable bias. Now, after the end of the twentieth century, there is clear recognition of the 
significance of an ideal index, and efforts are being made in many countries to bring measures of 
inflation closer to such an ideal. Thus, a technical problem with the original concept of indexed 
bonds was solved through many years of research in economic theory, and no longer stands as a 
serious obstacle to their implementation. 
Another reason that the indexed bonds then may have been the difficulties that a less 
educated population would have with index number calculations. Not only are people troubled by 
“math anxiety” when doing index calculations, but also people have a difficulty with intuitive 
understanding of the indexation concept. If this is true today, then it is all the more likely to have 
been true in colonial America. 
In 1997, I did a survey study of randomly selected people in the United States and Turkey to 
try to find what is the reason for their relative lack of interest in indexed bonds. Turkey was included 
for comparison, since Turkey was a high very high inflation country then.  I first tried to find out 
whether the general public could understand the concept of indexation, even testing them with a 
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simple arithmetic problem that related to the basic issues of indexation. More or less, people who 
agreed to answer the questionnaires in both countries seemed to be able to deal with the concept of 
indexation if challenged to do so.  
Thus, there are certainly plenty of people around who are confident of their understanding of 
indexation. And yet, some of these same people who rose to the challenge would also say that they 
did not want the indexation. There appeared to be no logical explanation for this resistance. One of 
the respondents explained that “I want to know how much money I will be getting.” Perhaps that 
statement just captures the basic feeling as well as any short statement could. There seems to be a 
habit of wanting money for its own sake, and of mistrusting mathematical formulas. 
Perhaps this resistance to indexation is another reason that the 1780 indexation scheme did 
not catch on. The only example we have of private indexation inspired by the public indexation 
scheme implicit in the depreciation notes is the example of President Langdon of Harvard. Then as 
now, only the intellectuals and academics, apparently, enthusiastically embraced indexation. 
The example of Harvard President Langdon calls to mind an experience of mine of a few 
years ago. When I talked to a treasury official in 1996 about possible plans for the issuance of U.S. 
indexed bonds, I was told that there was a joke at the U.S. Treasury Department then that if and 
when the indexed bonds are one day issued, Treasury should send the prospectus to the membership 
roster of the American Economics Association. These are the only people likely to be really 
interested, so the joke went.  Of course, the indexed bonds issued in the United States did get off to a 
slow start, but now comprise approximately 2% of the national debt. So, the demand for indexation 
has moved considerably beyond the economists, and the demand might well have extended far 
beyond President Langdon in the 18th century, if other conditions had been right.  
 
 15 
In the 18th century, as now, the concept of indexation must have been a difficult one, and the 
underlying economic theory beyond the intuitive ken of most people then. Economists and financial 
theorists can understand the concept. But if indexation is to succeed, also a public effort must be 
undertaken to teach its value to ordinary citizens. The world was apparently not ready for an 
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